ClaraWideProvider connection + safe egress QAClaraWide now separates provider identity from provider credentials, pins outbound work to an approved HTTPS origin, accepts relative endpoint paths only, collapses duplicate idempotency keys, and records immutable egress evidence. This build intentionally does not make a real external provider request.
Confirms schema v31, unsafe/local origin rejection, unknown secret-name rejection, strong-auth provider approval, approved-origin immutability, absolute-URL blocking, idempotency collapse and immutable egress evidence.
The intentional blocks prove that neither an unsafe origin nor an unapproved/overridden destination can become outbound work.
No QA provider connection loaded yet.
No sealed egress intents loaded yet.
No provider-egress events loaded yet.
These remain open until a real provider is selected, its exact production origin and secret references are approved, a bounded adapter is connected, provider failures are exercised and QA controls are disabled publicly. Checking a box here does not turn on provider traffic.
Clearing browser evidence does not rewrite server-owned provider registry, egress intents or event evidence.